London and the Greater London Council: restructuring the Capital of Capital by Murray, Robin
London and the Greater London Council: restructuring the Capital of
Capital'
Robin Murray
When I joined the GLC2 from the Institute of
Development Studies two years ago, I was often asked
what relevance I thought Third World experience
would have for economic strategy in an advanced
capitalist city.
Some comparisons immediately suggest themselves.
London, with 400,000 unemployed, now has the
greatest concentration of unemployment of any city in
the advanced world. In the last decade it has lost more
than half a million jobs. Severe poverty, particularly
among the sweated trades in East London, exists
within sight of the new offices of one of the richest
square miles in the world. It is a contrast reminiscent
of major Third World cities, as is the growing informal
economy which has accompanied the rise of
unemployment.
Yet one hesitates to push even the immediate
comparisons too far. London is still one of the major
metropolitan capitals of the world economy. The
issues facing it are de-industrialisation rather than
industrialisation. The drift of its population is away
from the city rather than towards it. There is still a
trade union tradition and welfare state, which
however much under seige, is markedly different from
the great majority of Third World countries today.
Contradictions have been much sharper in the Third
World. As a result the economic debates have raised
issues and argued strategies which are the very ones
relevant to metropolitan economies caught as they are
in the gathering recession. In this article I want to look
at London and the question of an appropriate
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economic strategy in relation to two such perspectives
i) the internationalisation of capital and ii) the role of
the market and economic growth. I will then say
something about the strategy being put into practice
by the GLC.
International London
First, I am repeatedly struck by the insularity of
analysis and policy in relation to London. At its
narrowest, the analysis moves scarcely beyond the
boundaries of London itself. London emerges from
the wings with certain geographical and/or historical
advantages, a centre of government and trade, and
therefore of markets. Exogenous factors are intro-
duced to explain the arrival or disappearance of this
trade or that. There are no theorems about the growth
of the London economy, because economic theorems
cannot be generated from a geographical space whose
existence as an economy (rather than a geographical
mapping) has become increasingly problematic.
Nor is a national framework adequate to understand
London's economy, either now or in any of the long
cyclical downswings of the last 100 years. During the
depression of the later 19th century, London's
economy survived because of the empire. Its large-
scale industries - shipbuilding, engineering and silk
weaving - had effectively collapsed by the 1 870s. The
industries that survived - clothing, footwear and
furniture - did so through matching the more
advanced production methods in the provinces and
abroad, by a resort to sweating. Those trades that were
still tied to London by raw materials or markets
moved out of Inner London, leaving an industrial
vacuum behind.
In spite of losing out in the course of a period of major
economic restructuring on the continent as well as in
Britain, London's economy actually grew. It did so
because London was still the administrative and
commercial heart of the largest empire in the world.
This was the age of the rebuilding of Whitehall, of the
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rise of those great department stores like Liberties, the
emporia of imperial produce, where the goods and
money derived from the empire met on home soil. lt
was the period when the range and techniques of
international banking and insurance were trans-
formed, and London was the acknowledged inter-
national centre for both. London's expansion was not
an export-led growth, but an imperial-led growth,
based on finance, commerce and power rather than
industry.
In the l930s the situation was quite different.
London's economy was sustained during the world
depression by industrial import substitution rather
than free trade in commercial services. There were two
pillars to this process. The first was the motor
industry, protected behind tariffs with production
serving the home market. The second was electricity.
The reorganisation of the electricity industry between
1926 and 1933 led to an explosion of domestic
consumption. In 1920 there had been 0.7 mn
consumers of electricity. By 1938 there were 8.9 mn.
London led the way, both in consumption and in the
new electrical engineering industries which grew up in
response.
So London in the inter-war period was doubly
fortunate. First tariffs and the breakdown in free trade
forced international competitors to locate in the UK.
Secondly, the fact that mass production of goods
preceded an adequate national communications
system for their distribution, meant that they were
located in or near the largest market, namely London.
While the rest of the country showed no growth at all
over the key years of recession (1930-35) London's
production grew by nearly 13 per cent. In the late 19th
century London grew because of the growth of free
trade. In the l930s her economy grew because of its
breakdown.
In the last 25 years London's position in the
international economy has again changed. Following
the trade liberalisation of 1958. and particularly after
British entry into the EEC in 1972, London has been
drawn into a European division of labour. increasingly
we have seen the spread of international corporate
economies, multinational firms like Kodak, Ford,
Philips, and ITT. operating their own planned intra-
firm international divisions of labour, and from the
l960s making Europe an area for such integrated
intra-firm specialisation.
In services, too. London lias been gathered into an
ever more complex international web. London
became the centre of the eurodollar market from the
late 1950s and a key site in an increasingly
internationalised capital market. Most of London's
top consultancy and accounting firms are themselves
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international, many of them American owned, as are
the top advertising agencies. London's major
engineering consultancy and design firms rely on the
export market, both to Europe and those areas of the
Third World that have traditionally been within the
European penumbra - Africa, the Middle East, and
parts of Asia. London has also become a European
junction for passengers, with a rapid growth in hotels
to accommodate them - comfortable warehouses for
the human entrepot trade.
The key point about the Europeanisation of capital is
that London now finds itself competing not just with
other parts of Britain but with other parts of Europe as
a Site for these functions. In telecommunications for
example there has been an acute competitive battle
over international traffic. For the time being British
Telecom (BT) (and this means London) has been
winning, by virtue of cutting international charges and
funding deficits from domestic charges. We can speak
of the last 25 years as a period more of free transfers
than of free trade. In the sphere of goods, more and
more international movements are taking place within
firms, not between them. In 1976 multinationals
accounted for 70 per cent of British exports. Of the
largest 31 exporters, intra-firm trade was nearly two
fifths of total trade. Overall, the figure for UK trade
was a third.
Even more important has been the movement of
information and people - international transfers
rather than trade, which has assumed a new
significance in the knowledge and information
economy of modern capitalism. Telecommunications
and airports have replaced the electric grid and roads
as the dominant infrastructure of the 1970s and 1980s.
Why should all this matter from the point of view of
strategy? Principally because all analysis implies a
strategy, just as each strategy has its own analysis.
Urban and regional studies which have emphasised
the relocation of industry between London and the
rest of the country as the principle issue, thereby give
strategic prominence to policies which might halt
industrial drift. But the evidence of these studies
makes it quite clear that it is not the redistribution of
industry within Britain which is the major cause ofjob
loss in London. The main causes should besought in
production, not in distribution, and in the consequences
for industry and employment of the restructuring of
London's economy in the context of Europeanisation.
London's manufacturing industries have been subject
to major changes in the production process linked in
most cases to new electronic technology. The fact that
London's manufacturing has seen a much steeper
decline in employment (37 per cent) than in industrial
output (14 per cent) during the 1970s, is an indication
of the sharp rise in labour productivity that has led to
the shedding of labour from London plants.
Equally the fall in output of 14 per cent during a period
that was still marked by industrial growth, reflects in
part the shift of industrial production to the continent
and beyond. Put in market terms, it reflects the
declining competitiveness of British industry. For
purposes of strategy it is to the issue of restructuring in
a European context rather than competition with the
declining regions in Britain that we should turn our
attention.
Similarly with services and the new infrastructure.
There is a major restructuring of the means of
communication now taking place associated with the
technological and geographical changes of the current
downswing. On the one hand, the Port of London
Authority supervised the run down of London's upper
docks. On the other, the growth of Heathrow, and its
attendant office, warehouse and hotel development,
has driven up prices in West London and, over the last
four years, forced a wave of manufacturing closures.
Its development, along with the changes in Britain's
motorway network, has forced a major reorganisation
of the West London economy.
If we wish to intervene in this all-pervading process of
restructuring, we cannot limit ourselves to issues of
industrial location within Britain alone. The debates
about premises, wages rates, green and pleasant fields
and regional grants seem miles away from the front
line of the battle. The context of restructuring is the
development of the transnational European economy.
It is this which is redefining London's role as the
capital of capital, and to which our strategies must
therefore be addressed.
Equally important, the very process of Europeani-
sation changes the effectiveness of different instru-
ments of policy. One example is banking. In the words
of The Banker: The internationalisation of key
financial markets. . . is a major constraint on the Bank
of England's role in supervising the regulation of the
London Stock Exchange. If restrictions are too tight,
large sections of the market will simply disappear
elsewhere - something that has already happened to
the business in South African gold shares', [November
1983, no 698, p lOI]. Another example is in the field of
industrial investment. Multinational companies -
Nissan is the most recent example - play off one EEC
country and region against the others, with respect to
grants, tax concessions, cheap finance, and soon. The
result, in the UK as in Ireland, has been a major
reduction in the net tax rates on multinational
business (that is, tax net of grant and other subsidies).
A study of 17 of the top 20 UK companies in 1982
showed that 14 of them paid no Corporation Tax at
all, as the result of offsets, allowances, and declared
losses.
In these cases, the multinationalisation of capital has
introduced a new political economy of nation-states.
They are brought into competition not through the
exchange of goods and services on the international
market (the traditional model of international trade),
but through attempted attraction of multinational
investment on the one hand, and multinational profit
declaration on the other. The traditional instruments
of international trade - changes in exchange rate,
exchange controls, tariffs, monetary and now fiscal
policy - have all been shown to be eroded by the force
of the transnational corporate economy.
The 75 factories in London which - in October 1982
- still had more than 500 workers are all, with two
exceptions, owned by multinationals. London's major
offices, advertisers, accounting firms, engineering
firms, financial institutions, insurance companies -
are again predominantly owned by multinationals.
They dominate the commanding heights of the
London economy. Yet their very multinationalisation
restricts the effects of conventional public intervention.
Local and national government is bound by its
competitors in such an economy, as an enterprise is
bound by the level of its competitors' prices.
It would be to lose a dimension to see London solely in
its international context. It is - and has been for the
last four hundred years - a capital of national capital.
Yet that said, London's changing structure - its
dynamic - can still be best understood in terms of its
changing place in the international division of labour.
Development economists will recognise in this one of
the themes in the analysis of Third World economies
today. There has, of course, been strong debate
between national approaches to Third World studies,
and those which emphasise the international deter-
mination of the course of these economies. The precise
relationship between national states and the inter-
national economy has still been far from adequately
resolved - whether at the level of abstract theory
(neo-classical, Ricardian or Marxist), or at the level of
concrete analysis. But with smaller and less developed
countries in particular, it has been difficult for anyone
not to acknowledge the overarching dominance of
international economic forces. This is the first
contribution development studies can make to our
understanding of London.
London, the Market and Accumulation
The second contribution is in the field of economic
growth. The debate on growth theory is no more than
the debate on development, running from the
changing emphases on money capital, consumption,
skilled labour, entrepreneurship and technology, to
more general theories of capital accumulation. The
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debates on strategy have centred round these theories:
how to increase savings, aid or trade, import
substitution or export promotion, foreign investment
versus the development of national industry, alter-
native channels of technology transfer, primitive
socialist accumulation versus international capitalist
accumulation and so on.
One line in the development debate has been reflected
in urban analysis - that which advocates a more or
less hard version of the free market strategy.
According to this, development will take place as long
as the conditions and mechanisms of capitalist
circulation are working. In development theory, many
obstacles have been identified over the years: the
family farm, the backward bending supply curve of
labour, the absence of local capital markets,
fluctuating export markets, over-protected local
economies, and many various state 'interferences'.
Even the radical literature has commonly identified
the causes of underdevelopment with imperfections in
the circulation process - particularly the dependency
school: unequal terms of trade because of imperial
monopolies, multinational companies favouring
capital intensive rather than labour intensive methods
of production, internal pre-capitalist ruling class
monopolies over savings, markets, firms, and labour.
Behind them all was some version of the free market,
non-skewed consumption patterns, and in progressive
versions, more equal distributions of income.
The parallel for London is that London cannot 'buck
the trend'. Manufacturing is effectively finished for
London, and should not be saved. Instead the task for
the GLC should be to prepare the necessary
infrastructure for the new service industries, attract in
new projects (such as the Olympic Games or a new
airport in Docklands) and advertise London's
qualities to overcome any imperfections in information.
The new orthodoxy in planning theory is to dismantle
public controls in land use planning, and to take the
state out of the urban economy.
More moderate policies concentrate on the state
making good where the market has for some reason
failed. The supply of premises for small businesses is
particularly popular at the moment. So is the
encouragement of small firms, of free market
competition and innovation. In these cases state
intervention is justified, as it is in the provision of
advice and soft loans for such businesses. Other
instances are the provision of training, the reclamation
of derelict land, or the building of roads in order to
bring particular premises and areas back into the
market.
In these approaches the question of accumulation goes
by default. If markets are working, if taxation and
50
state regulation does not disadvantage an area, or curb
incentives, then saving and re-investment will look
after itself.
In the Third World, this approach has been vigorously
challenged. It was so clearly in the interests of the
dominant metropolitan powers to have free markets
into and within Third World countries, that a critical
literature developed. In orthodox theory the exceptions
to the market rule defined themselves in terms of the
market: the infant industry argument for protection
and even the infant economy argument. Both implied
that the interruption of free trade would be temporary.
Public intervention in the free market was also
justified on the grounds that there existed external
economies and diseconomies, but the concept and its
application again confirmed the overall robustness of
market theory. They might equally be analysed as
'beyond the market economies', or economies internal
to non market models of allocating labour. What was
rapidly rediscovered was that the doctrine of free
trade, like free markets, was in Joan Robinson's words
'the mercantilism of the strong'. Structural inequalities
meant that free market relations would as surely
favour the strong, as would a hundred-yard race
favour the able bodied over the lame. Marxist theory
offered the most substantial account of how such
structural inequality (spatial, as well as social,
corporate, as well as international) was produced and
reproduced through the mechanism of capitalist
circulation.
If the market could not be relied on, then alternative
theorems and guidelines were required for develop-
ment. Preobrezensky advanced a strategy based on
raising labour productivity in agriculture, switching
agricultural surplus product to manufacturing, and
appropriating Western technology under the strictest
monopsonistic terms to improve labour productivity
more generally. He and other members of the Left
Opposition in the 1920s did not ignore the world
market, indeed as one of them said, the price
catalogues of the capitalist world market provide the
measure against which the advance of socialist
accumulation can be judged. But the allocation of
labour within the Soviet economy, its strategic
direction, the apportioning of investment goods -
none of these relied on comparisons of individual
market prices.
¡cite the case of the Soviet Union in the 1920s because
it produced some of the most articulate and
theoretically aware statements of economic develop-
ment strategy which works in but against the market.
Other import substitution strategies have diverged
from market prescriptions but rarely with so coherent
an alternative theoretical system. The tendency has
always been towards individual project-based
approaches rather than more macro strategies. Cost
benefit analysis as used in many parts of the Third
World has been the vehicle for this. At times the cost
benefit argument seems to imply that all macro
strategic policy can be expressed in accounting values.
But it is not clear that the translation of general
strategy into particular projects needs such quanti-
fication. Although modified, market prices are again
the loadstone for project assessment. Once this project
oriented approach is established, it has been but a
short step to the introduction of world market prices
via Little-Mirlees Manuals or the methodologies of the
World Bank.
Given the strength of the debate in the Third World, it
is striking how powerful and relatively unchallenged
the principle of the market is in the London economy.
I am not merely thinking of conventional local
authority policies. There is also the profound
ideological power of the concept of 'viability' and its
poor cousin, 'subsidy'.
Some of the objections to the use of the market as the
basic criterion for restructuring the London economy
remain within the static approach of market theory
itself. I will list these briefly:
external economies which cannot be realised by
individual enterprises because they cannot appropriate
result of their investments; for example industrial
training;
inequalities of income (and/or mobility) so that
changes which benefit one section of consumers are at
the expense of others; for example supermarkets
requiring private transport displacing neighbourhood
shops;
mass production which lowers unit cost but
reduces choice;
the presence of monopolies who drive out
competition through price wars; a notable example is
in London's bread industry;
y) locational decisions in which the social costs and
benefits are not adequately reflected in market costs;
this would apply to most cases of a shift of investment
from London to green field sites.
In each of these cases there is a clear argument for
public intervention, to ensure that restructuring takes
place in a way which reflects wider social interests than
those embodied in market prices.
But the arguments are still couched in terms of
modifications of the market. Put another way, they
represent micro interventions in and against the
market. The macro strategic questions remain.
There are four more general objections to the market
as an instrument of restructuring.
î) Investment and the market
The restructuring that is required is commonly on
such a large scale, and is undertaken over such a long
period, that the market is an inadequate guide to
choice.
Major multinational companies have to determine
their strategy with respect to systems and products
that they believe will eventually become competitive
but whose profitability they cannot possibly measure
for many years to come. The Japanese are most noted
for this point. They do not constantly apply
Discounted Cash Flows (DCF5) and criteria of short
term profitability. Their planning and financial
systems are geared to the long, internationally
strategic view, in a manner not unreminiscent of the
Soviet economic strategies of the 1920s.
ii) Crisis and the market
In spite of its increasing inadequacy for many project
decisions, the market remains the major instrument of
economic restructuring. But the way in which such
restructuring takes place at the macro level through
economic crisis is so brutal, wasteful and actually
dangerous, that it is astonishing that its uninhibited
use is still so generally accepted. The pattern of crisis
has been remarkably consistent. After 25 years or so of
economic expansion, there has followed 25 years of
downswing. During this period profit rates decline,
competition sharpens, credit is extended, as is the new
technology which is to dominate any future upswing.
In the 1930s it was automobiles and electrical goods.
From the mid 1960s it has been electronics, and oil
based products. In all previous cases the depths of the
depression have seen: a) a major financial crash and
writing off of capital values; b) a sustained attack on
wage levels and the control of labour within the
production process; c) the increase of productivity
through rationalisation, the introduction of new work
methods and technology, and the speed up in the
circulation time of production. It has also almost
always been accompanied by massive unemployment
and war. In other words major restructuring has
always taken place at the expense of labour.
The period of monetarist policy since mid 1979, can be
seen as an attempt to hasten this process. The
exchange rate was intentionally driven up in order to
squeeze profitability, discipline labour and drive out
of business the less efficient firms. The result has been
a massive rise in industrial closures and unemployment
in London and elsewhere.
Nor has it been necessarily the least efficient who have
been driven out, leaving the most efficient from which
the new shoots of growth will spring. Take London's
furniture industry as a case in point. The four largest
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firms are now out of business. Each needed long runs
to break even, and could not cope when the recession
hit. The less capitalised firms were more flexible and
some have survived.
Further, power has been increasingly moving to the
large retailers. They have been involved in restructur-
ing retailing, and have been as pleased to import from
abroad as to restructure the furniture producers at
honie. The result has been that for UK and London
industry at least, the industrial base on which any
renewed growth could take place has all but been
destroyed. The pool of highly skilled workers in East
London and on up the Lea Valley has been dissipated.
The firms who remain have been unable to match the
strategies of continental manufacturers towards
custom fitted furniture and large-scale precision panel
cutting, or the design led cooperative associations in
Italy. The destruction of London's furniture industry
is paralleled in many branches of engineering.
Employment and the market
There is no mechanism in the market economy to
ensure that the destruction of some jobs will be
matched by the creation of others. Rather the history
of capitalist development has been one of creating a
surplus population. This is how I read the
phenomenon of unemployment in the Third World.
On the one hand advanced country technology drove a
rapier through artisanal forms of economy - in the
countryside and in the small-scale crafts of the towns.
Plastic, soft drinks, the tractor - these were some of
the typical destroyers of traditional employment.
Much of the resultant profit however was then
repatriated to metropolitan countries for accumulation
there. Advanced country accumulation and full
employment was maintained, drawing in immigrant
workers when the metropolitan labour supply was
exhausted, at the expense of accumulation and
employment in the Third World. In the current period,
this mechanism lias no longer been sustained. From
the early 1970s the decline in levels of profitability led
to money capital being exported back to the newly
industrialising countries (NICs) and to the socialist
world. Accumulation in the advanced countries
slowed down. New technology further reduced the
demand for labour. Unemployment rates have risen
dramatically through the advanced capitalist countries.
Even with an economic upturn, there is no longer any
guarantee of full employment, particularly in less
competitive economies such as the UK. This is why it is
in no way enough to accept the redefinition of
London's place in the European division of labour,
since it provides no promise of full employment.
Labour and the market
The rule of the market always tends to bear down on
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the wages and conditions of labour. Cheaper labour
will lead to lower prices and an undercutting of other
labour. This is the key to understanding much of
monetarist strategy, first against the private sector,
and then against the state. The latter has now come to
the forefront of the government's economic strategy in
London as in the rest of the country. In local
government at least this lias singularly failed to work.
Capital investment and the purchase of goods and
equipment have been cut first, along with part-time
workers.
The main body of unionised labour has remained
remarkably strong. In addition the government has
attempted to liberalise and privatise in order to
weaken labour within the state economy. The relevant
point for our discussion is that money and the market
have been used as instrunients for the discipline of
labour.
London's economy, therefore, must be seen not only
in terms of its reorientation towards Europe, but in the
context of a process of economic accumulation subject
to quite definite laws. I have suggested that the market
is an inadequate concept to understand this process of
accumulation, even though the laws of this accumu-
lation bear down on individual enterprises through the
medium of the niarket and the principle of
profitability. The market is not an adequate guide for
strategy. It has currently plunged London into its
deepest recession of the century. As a mechanism for
identifying and rewarding the most productive, it has
commonly closed down the potentially most efficient,
and consigned to the sidelines with zero productivity
400,000 London workers, 32 mn square feet of
industrial and commercial buildings, and many
machines. So deep has the destruction been, that
London may already have lost many branches of
manufacturing permanently, regardless of an upturn.
Over all this broods the threat of a major international
financial collapse which would devalue capital as a
precondition for a return to profitability. In these
circumstances, the use of market-determined profit-
ability as a guideline is profoundly mistaken. It is like a
compass which is pointing the wrong way. So far from
economic strategy being geared to freeing the market
or perfecting it, it should be directed primarily against
the market, even while operating within it.
Economic Strategy and the GLC
The GLC's current economic strategy starts from the
problem rather than its powers. I have outline'd the
problem as I see it in the earlier sections. I shall now
discuss the strategy we see as necessary in this context.
The central question is that of industrial restructuring.
We are quite clear that there is no institution
adequately dealing with the issue in Britain, let alone
in London. In the USA large-scale managerial capital
has been organising industrial restructuring directly,
as J. P. Morgan did in the 1930s, though on this
occasion without the support of a New Deal
interventionist government. In Germany the banks
still perform the major role in restructuring,
controlling much of German industry, and insisting
on a clear 'hands-on' role. In Japan the task is being
performed by MITT, effectively a Ministry of
Industrial Planning, staffed by 2,500 professionals
who co-ordinate industrial capitalists and the
financial institutions in continual programmes of
reorganising declining industries and growing ones. In
Britain, since the days of the Industrial Reorganisation
Corporation (IRC), and to a lesser extent the National
Enterprise Board (NEB), there is almost nothing. The
Ministry of Industry has sponsored a number of
schemes organised by management consultancy firms
and merchant banks to restructure narrow branches of
the engineering industry, but by and large the stock
market remains the major instrument for restructuring,
along with the large enterprises.
The GLC's Greater London Enterprise Board
(GLEB) aims to be interventionist in these terms. It
has built up a team which includes management
consultants, accountants, trade unionists, techno-
logists and property specialists, which is capable of
intervening to prevent the closure of London's
potentially profitable manufacturing firms. It now
owns or partly owns 35 companies including factories
making furniture, clothing, car components, com-
puters, robots, shoes and electronic components. In all
200 enterprises have been assisted, saving or creating
2,000 jobs. This has been the first stage.
But GLEB's aim is to go beyond single interventions
of this kind. It has built up a strategy division, together
with the Economic Policy Group in the GLC, which is
devising strategies for those industries over which the
GLC and GLEB can hope to have some influence:
furniture, clothing, printing, instrument engineering,
catering and the cultural industries. The aim in each
case is to consider the position of London's industry
within an international context, and its prospects of
market survival if it was reorganised, with modern
equipment, consolidated design and marketing. The
emphasis is on productivity, careful fashioning of the
product, and, where possible, reconstruction after a
devaluation of capital (usually through a receivership).
Our second major point is that the restructuring which
does take place need not occur in any one way, or in
any one place. Our concern is to ensure that it is
moulded to the needs of ordinary Londoners, both as
workers and consumers. To begin with, GLEB only
assists firms which allow access to trade unions, and
which agree to sign an Enterprise Agreement. This is
an agreement involving the enterprise, the trade
unions and GLEB, and governing the overall direction
of the business, conditions for the workforce, training
provision, and so on. lt also may involve represent-
atives from the workforce sitting on the management
board.
Already in the firms funded or taken over, jobs have
been preserved or created in ways which maintain the
organised strength and involvement of the workforce.
But in some sectors we can already see the process of
'restructuring for labour' going further. In London
Transport the GLC resisted attempts to move to One
Person Operated trains and buses, on the grounds that
guards and conductors provide a service, and that it
made no economic sense to cut such productive labour
at a time of high unemployment. Instead it aimed to
increase prductivity through expanding the service,
redesigning ticketing systems, and integrating different
parts of the transport network.
Similarly in the field of new technology. There is no
one new technology. Work with which the GLC and
GLEB have been closely engaged at the University of
Manchester Institute of Science and Technology, has
shown how numerically controlled lathes and
automatic factory systems do not need to involve the
deskilling of formerly highly skilled workers. They can
be designed to build on that skill, and the lathes which
are in operation have shown themselves more efficient
than a lathe which depends on a white collar
programmer to come down and put it right, while the
semi-skilled operator looks on. Similarly, the
technology networks GLEB has been developing as an
alternative to Science Parks, have been applying the
skills and capacities of universities and polytechnics to
issues such as energy conservation, and new
technology for health and the disabled.
We can put the general point in this way. The
restructuring of industries and processes can take
many forms. Private capital operating within the
discipline of the market will tend to choose certain
solutions, usually at the expense of labour. GLEB and
the GLC believe that it is more rational and consistent
with the general goals of a socialist economy, to
develop alternative solutions, building on the ideas of
the workforce themselves.
GLEB has found that an institution of its size and
resources (f30 mn in the current financial year) can
have most effect on medium sized, often family firms,
ill managed, but with a skilled workforce and
commonly a quality product. The GLC for its part has
directed its activities towards the restructuring taking
place in state industries - British Telecom, the
Central Electricity Generating Board, the Port of
London Authority, the National Flealth Service, as
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well as London Transport. The other major economic
institutions are the multinationals. Against them the
GLC may be seen to have less power. The strategy we
have adopted is to set up an early warning system,
linked into the Trade Union movement, to identify
potential closures and redundancies in the larger
factories. The GLC then supports the unions within
the plant. Sometimes it is a question of bargaining
with the central management about closure. In other
cases it has been supporting the development of an
international combine of trade unionists in the same
company to bargain with the international manage-
ment about future investment plans and their location.
In each sector an adequate alternative strategy cannot
be developed by council officials alone, however well-
intentioned they are. It has to involve the workforce,
sympathetic managers, and wherever possible the
consumers as well. In London some 250,000 people
are paid to think, design, invent, account, guide and
co-ordinate public and private enterprise and public
services. They work approximately seven million
hours thinking a week. Most of this thinking is locked
into the directions dictated by the market. For a
substantial rather than formal development of
economic democracy, we feel strongly that there must
be time other than in the evenings for ordinary people
to think about and plan their industries. They should
be able to call on the services of thinkworkers -
thinking on their lines rather than those dictated by
profitability. To this end we have funded nearly 120
people whose task it is to be a resource of this kind.
The Council has some further powers to contribute.
On the side of finance, we have set up a London-wide
investment fund, sourced from London public
pension funds. We have also begun to use our
shareholder power with respect to major companies,
and are involved in a scheme, already well established
in the United States, to link different local authorities
together to increase shareholder power.
The council is a major purchaser. When marketing
and brand names are substantial barriers to entry,
Council purchasing is a potential lever on large
suppliers. In New York, school meals purchasing has
been used to change the quality and ingredients of
supplies, with a significant impact on children's diets.
We are implementing a similar scheme here. We have
also set up a Contract Compliance Unit which is an
investigatory body to ensure that suppliers follow the
GLC codes of practice on equal opportunities for
women and for black people.
Some of the major ways of controlling the market
economy lie outside our capacity. We are not a
monetary authority, nor can we operate tariffs and
exchange controls. We do not control an army -
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though we have pressed for more accountable and
local control of the police. The absence of these
powers to intervene in circulation has helped us to
concentrate on issues of production and productivity.
But undoubtedly the broader powers would be
required for any macro attack on the current levels of
unemployment and depression.
Having said that, however, Keynesian reflation by
itself will not restore full employment. It has to
accompany the kind of detailed industrial policy I
have outlined. It is a policy which has to adddress the
issues of productivity, technological change, and
strategic restructuring within an international context.
It has to do this because the key condition for
capitalist accumulation is profitability, and the
conditions of profitability are primarily determined in
production. Keynes - mistakenly in my view -
identified the conditions for macro profitability in
consumption, and Keynesian policy is above all
directed at the spheres of consumption and
distribution, to alter the aggregate levels of demand.
Macroeconomic management of the main variables of
circulation have pride of place in Keynesian strategy:
levels of taxation, interest, and exchange rates.
Industrial policy is consigned to a subordinate role.
At the GLC we believe this relation should be
inverted. We see industrial policy as being primary,
conducted not through the general manipulation of
markets, but by particular interventions in production,
enterprise by enterprise, and branch by branch. It is a
strategy of detail, concerned with all the awkwardness
of material production, in contrast to the financiers's
disdain of detail and preference for the abstract world
of money and the market. General economic
management should be subordinate to industrial
policy.
As long as the market and profitability remain the
main economic mechanisms there will be an inherent
tension with these material goals. In intervening in the
market economy, what we aim to do is to strengthen
the socially useful forces, however bound they may
finally be by the conditions of profitability. This is why
we speak of operating in and against the market.
The government is opposed to the GLC's strategies for
transport, employment, redistribution, energy, the
arts, housing, construction, the democratic account-
ability of the police, and effective action against
discrimination. In all these the GLC has been trying to
construct alternatives to those advanced by the
government. The abolition proposals and the
campaign against them have put urban strategy at the
centre of British politics.
Third World countries have often experienced the
pincer movement between the economic discipline of
the market on the one hand, and the political
discipline of an authoritarian state on the other. There
are parallels now emerging in London as in Britain as a
whole. London, like the Third World, now faces a
conflict of strategies whose outcome will shape the
way in which it develops, and for whom, for the rest of
the century.
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